Introduction
In business today, awareness of risk is growing, and risk management is increasingly seen as a critical practical discipline (Teach, 1997) . Further, risk is being defined broadly to include anything that could have a significant negative effect on the business.
For example, Microsoft recently began an integrated approach to risk management (Teach, 1997) . Twelve 12 categories of business risk were identified, including financial, operational, people, and political risks (see Figure 1 ). Having identified these risks, Microsoft set about mapping them on several dimensions, such as potential frequency of loss producing event, potential severity, and adequacy of insurance. This analysis revealed that less than 50 percent of Microsoft's total business risk was adequately covered-an insight that led to the development of more effective risk management plans.
In the field of Information Systems, there has long been an interest in the risks associated with information systems and technology (Davis and Olson, 1985; McFarlan, 1988) . However, as a field, we have not taken an integrated approach to the identification, analysis and management of IT-related risk. By failing to do so, we are missing an important opportunity to make a major contribution in an area of pressing business need.
In this paper, I first show that our field's approach to the topic of IT-related risk has been quite fragmented, and I make the case that business people need a more integrated view of the topic. Next, I discuss some issues that help frame a theoretical perspective on IT-related risk. Lastly, I examine some efforts at conceptua l integration and show where they need bolstering for an integrated framework of IT-related risk management.
IT-Related Risk in the IS Literature and in Business Practice
The IS field has provided many useful insights for IS professionals and business mana gers in the domain of IT-related risks. Many individual types of IT-related risk have been isolated and studied, although they are not always labeled as risks. For example, there is a sizable IS literature on the topic of IS project failure (Keil, 1995; Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; Sauer, 1993) . IS project failure can usefully be categorized as an ITrelated risk, but it is only one of many. Other IT-related risks include operational failure or lack of reliability (Markus and Tanis, 2000) , security breaches (Baskerville, 1993; Straub, 1990; Straub and Nance, 1990; Straub and Welke, 1998) , reputational damage to a company owing to its failure to safeguard the privacy of customer data (Smith, 1994) , and strategic risk (Vitale, 1986) , such as adopting a new IT too soon or too late.
In general, IS research on risks falls into two broad categories: 1) risks related to the development of information systems and 2) risks related to the ongoing operation of information systems. This grouping of IT-related risks mirrors the way that such risks are managed in practice by IS professionals. Most IS organizations structurally separate applications development from operations. In some cases, application development reports directly to business units, while operations reports to the CIO. Thus, the separate frameworks developed for managing project risks (Keil, 1995) versus operational risks (Straub and Welke, 1998) meet the needs of the different categories of IS professionals engaged in these tasks.
The major exception to the general statement that the academic treatment of ITrelated risks is fragmented into discrete investigations of a variety of project and operational risks is Peter Neumann's treatise on Computer-Related Risks (Neumann, 1995) compiled from the Internet newsgroup, The Risks Forum, that Neumann has moderated for years. Neumann justly refers to his work as integrated treatment of computer-related risks, and I will discuss this work more later. But it is more properly viewed as a Computer Science contribut ion than a work in the Information Systems tradition.
However well the divergent approach to studying IT-related risks fits current IS practice, it is disadvantageous from the perspective of the executive leadership of companies making major investments in information technology. Executives tend to become involved in critical IT decision-making only when new IS development or enhancement projects are initiated. They rarely become involved in IT operational issues unless there has been a significant problem, such as a major operational failure or a serious security breach. Thus, executives tend to be distanced from making decisions concerning operational IT-related risks. Integrated frameworks for IT investment decision-making that combine benefits, costs, and both development and operational risks could help ensure better decisions from an organization-wide perspective.
From the business point of view, dividing the management of IT-related risk into development risk and a collection of disparate operational risks is counterproductive.
Businesses should think of their IT initiatives as investments that are intended to pay off over their entire lifecycles. While it is true that the nature of IT-related risk changes as an IT investment progresses through its lifecycle, an integrated approach to IT-related risk management allows for intelligent tradeoffs between development costs and risks on the one hand and operational costs and risks on the other. Lack of an integrated approach to IT-related risk management makes possible the situation in which decisions designed to reduce project cost and schedule risk (e.g., ignore control needs, short cut training and testing, etc.) may actually increase the operational risks of non-use, external threat, and contingencies.
The case of the Fox-Meyer Drug Company provides a useful illustration of how companies can suboptimize total business risk while attempting to manage project metrics. When Fox-Meyer Drug chartered its ERP system implementation, the CIO was aware that it was a "bet your business" proposition (Bulkeley, 1996) . Yet, the $60 Million project was approved at the same time that the company also embarked on a state-of-the art $18 Million automated warehouse. During the Project Phase, bad luck intervened: Fox-Meyer Drug lost a large customer, accounting for 15% of its business.
To increase revenues, the company aggressively bid on new business: they figured contract pricing on the assumption that the projected annual $40 Million savings from the SAP project would be realized immediately on startup, and they decided to advance the SAP rollout by 90 days. That close to the end of the project, little was left to do other than training and testing. So project team members decided not to test modules that had not been customized (thus failing to detect configuration errors). Cutover to the new system resulted in disaster. Meanwhile, the automated warehouse also did not perform as planned. It was estimated that the company sustained an unrecoverable loss of $15
Million from erroneous shipments. The company was forced into bankruptcy, and shareholders have since sued both the enterprise systems vendor and the integration consultant for $500 Million each.
In this example, there are multiple, interacting factors in the failure. Some of them lay within the company's control, others did not. But the example clearly shows that decisions made to address development issues can have much wider consequences. One wonders whether Fox-Meyer's executives would have been so willing to advance the project schedule if they had taken a serious look at the likelihood and consequences of operational failure owing to poor project testing.
Today, in the business world, there is much discussion of "TCO," the total cost of ownership of IT systems. The TCO concern first arose in the context of standalone PCs (Strassmann, 1990) . But the TCO issue has acquired special significance in the context of packaged enterprise resource planning (ERP) software. Initially, executives focused only on the sizable license costs of this software. Later, they learned that ERP software license costs often pale in comparison with the costs of configuration consulting, technical platform, end-user training, and maintenance. Today, it is generally considered best business practice for executives to consider both the total lifecycle costs and the total lifecycle benefits of an IT investment. Should not the third major component of an executive's IT investment decision-making be total lifecycle risks, where this concept comprises both project and operational risks?
An integrated approach to the management of IT-related risk is especially important in the current era for two reasons. First, worldwide connectivity through the Internet increases the opportunities for widespread fraud and cascading operational failure. Second, organizations are increasingly relying on outside parties for the development, operation, and management of their information systems. One could argue that IT-related risk management (ensuring investment payoff, while controlling potential negative consequences) is the only IT job an organization has left in an environment of total outsourcing.
Framing the Discussion of IT -Related Risk
An integrated approach to IT-related risk must start with basic definitions. In this section, I define IT-related risk, present a typology of IT-related risks, discuss the issue of stakeholders-whose goals are to be served?-and outline the academic case for an integrated approach to this important topic.
What is IT-related risk?
A significant obstacle in the way of an integrated approach to IT-related risk is definitional: what is the appropriate level of analysis of IT-related risk? And what is risk?
Discussions of IT-related risk often take a computer-based information system-a technical artifact-to be the appropriate level of analysis for the study of risk. And, certainly, important technical issues, such as the existence of "trap doors" in software or the vulnerability of much modified code, must be addressed in any complete treatment of IT-related risks. But the perspective I am advocating in this article suggests that there is need for an integrated treatment of IT-related risks at the organizational and interorganizational levels of analysis. At the organizational level, the knowledge and skills of users and their social interactions while using computer-based information systems are as important to an understanding of risk as is the technical system itself. And, since so many of today's most interesting IT developments involve "business-to-business" and "business-to-consumer" e-commerce, it is often necessary to extend an analysis of risks beyond the boundaries of a single organization.
Different connotations and definitions of IT-related risk can be found in the literature and in common usage. One common definition holds risk to be uncertainty;
alternatively, a risk is a wager (or an attempt at rewards). A second definition considers risk to be the possibility of loss. A third definition views risk as a negative quality of an opportunity that must be effectively managed. A few authors (Clemons, 1995; Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987) This paper proposes an integrated view of IT-related risks from the perspective of an executive decision-maker, not because I think that executives are smarter, more ethical, or more important than other stakeholders. Instead, I am arguing that it is in the best interests of rational, well-informed executive decision-makers to manage the total lifecycle risks of IT investments, regardless of who might be most affected by the risks.
Given the fragmentation of IS practice into development versus operational concerns, it is not likely that IS professionals are as well placed as organizational executives to manage the full spectrum of IT-related risks. I hasten to add, however, the IS professionals are essential partners in the effective management of IT-related risk. properly chosen system architectural approaches and good software engineering practice can enhance both security and reliability. Thus, it is highly advantageous to consider both reliability and security within a common framework, along with other properties such as application survivability and application safety. (Neumann, 1995, pp. 129-130, emphasis added) In the IS system failure literature, there is widespread recognition that development and implementation/use issues must be jointly considered. For example, Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1987) discuss both development failures and use failures (i.e., failure in operation) and argue that different failure types must be addressed in a common framework. Markus and Keil (1994) and Markus and Tanis (2000) make similar points.
The academic case for an integrated approach to IT-related risk management
In the area of IS security, Baskerville (1993) makes a compelling case for an integrated approach to system development and the management of operational IT security risks. By tracing the evolution of system development and security management methods, he shows that initially there was no integration. Gradually, security risk analysis and management procedures have become built into system development methods. By extension, management of all other IT-related risks listed earlier in this paper should also be incorporated in system development methods.
In short, here and there in the literature, it is possible to find arguments that, when assembled, call for an integrated approach to the management of IT-related risk. Such an approach would encompass both project failure and a range of operational risks, including those related to safety, reliability, security, privacy, nonuse, and reputation.
Theoretical Perspectives on IT -Related Risk and Risk Control
Since Neumann (1995) claims to have taken an integrated approach to computerrelated risks, what more needs to be done? Cannot the IS field simply adopt Neumann's framework and declare the problem solved?
On the contrary, I argue that, while Neumann's work is an important first step toward an integrated theory of IT-risk and risk management, it is lacking in a number of areas that require theoretical integration. Those areas are the social psychological dimensions of risk perception, the structural conditions of risk management, the dynamics of risk control, and the dynamics of risk. Neumann (1995) does a thorough job of treating the various system-related causes, both accidental and intentional, of computer-related disasters. While he includes a chapter on "the human element," this chapter falls far short of capturing the socialpsychological processes that go into the human side of the equation. Notably absent from his discussion is the phenomenon of "escalating commitment" to a losing course of action that has proved so useful in analyzing certain IS project failures (Keil, 1995; Staw, 1993) .
Social psychological dimensions of risk perception
Also lacking is a treatment of the many cognitive biases that are known to affect people's judgment in making decisions involving risk (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) , in dealing with crises (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993) , and in problem solving in complex situations (Dorner, 1989) . For a wonderful complement on the human side to Neumann's technologyoriented analysis, see Dörner (1989) .
Structural conditions of risk management
A second area in which Neumann's analysis of computer-related risks needs augmentation for the IS domain is that of the structural conditions in which IT-related risk is created and materializes into problems. Structural conditions are the social and economic arrangements (e.g., reporting relationships and policies) that influence the processes and outcomes of IS work (Orlikowski, 1992) . Examples of relevant structural conditions include the separation of development from operations work in many IS departments and the outsourcing of selected IT-related tasks to consultants and vendors.
Neumann discusses large programming projects as a human source of risk, but he says nothing about how variations in the organization and management of such projects might contribute to the incidence or control of risks.
Dynamics of control
A third area in which Neumann's analysis of computer-related risks needs enhancement is that of the dynamics of risk control strategies. Neumann (1995) devotes an entire chapter to strategies for controlling risk, such as modeling, and simulation, complexity management, reliability improvement approaches and so forth. Interestingly, while his analysis of computer-related risks is quite holistic, his approach to risk control is not: it is in essence a laundry list of techniques and rules of thumb. He does not attempt an integrated methodology of system engineering for the prevention of risk nor tackle the issue of how to recover from failure. He also does not tackle the difficult problem of ensuring that people follow acceptable methodologies. (Hence the importance of understanding the structural conditions under which IS work gets done.)
An integrated theory of risk control needs to address what is known about the different types of strategies for gaining and maintaining control over people and organizational processes. Review of the control literature suggests that the types of control potentially useful in managing IT-related risk are as varied as the risks themselves (Handy, 1995; Simons, 1995a; Simons, 1995b) . For example, Straub and Welke (1998) identify four distinct, sequential activities involved in the management of systems security risks: deterrence, prevention, detection, and recovery. Combining these sources, a list of risk control strategies would surely include the following: Further, the control literature suggests that control attempts are not invariably successful. While it is generally recognized that too little control is bad, a sizable body of literature suggests that too much control is also bad. Too much control has been associated with three types of negative consequences. First, too much control is expensive. In fact, the high cost of control is a major reason given for reengineering business processes with looser control (Sia and Neo, 1997) . Second, too much control can interfere with business operation and flexibility and can damage the relationship between controllers and controllees (Block, 1993) . Third, too much control is associated with unintended human and social consequences (Handy, 1995; Sitkin and Roth, 1993) . These negative consequences include low morale and circumventing the rules; ironically, excessive control can also promote fraud. There is a science of control, just as there is a science of the technology failure, and an integrated theory must incorporate both.
Dynamics of risk
As we move toward an integrated theory of IT-related risk and risk management, it is important to keep in mind the empirical evidence about how problems, crises, and disasters materialize from risk. Studies of nuclear power plant accidents (Perrow, 1984) and IT-related accidents (Neumann, 1995) show that crises, disasters, and failures often have multiple independent or correlated causes. These "weak link" phenomena remind us that we should not take a static view of risk but should recognize that risk is a dynamic function of technology developments and human interventions.
The literature on IT project risk often appears to assume that risk is greatest at the start of the project when the unknowns are greatest, then decreases over the life of the project as work progresses toward completion. This view suggests that risk does not remain static, but changes as a function of prior decisions and behavior. Therefore, one can posit the concept of "residual risk" that varies throughout a project (Nidumolu, 1995) and by extension throughout the lifecycle of a system.
Residual risk is often assumed to decrease monotonically over the life of IT projects; but, in the IT domain, one must consider the possibility that residual risk will actually increase over a system's lifecycle. In the first place, as systems age, they are maintained and enhanced; over time, this process increases their fragility or failureproneness (Lientz and Swanson, 1980) . (This is why there is such a strong emphasis on development for maintainability, another example of the need for an integrated risk management approach.) Further, there is an increasing trend toward the integration of formerly discrete systems. As systems are integrated with other systems, complexity and tight-coupling increase the chances of failure (Neumann, 1995; Perrow, 1984) . For example, in a recent project involving the implementation of SAP R/3 financials, Microsoft loaded financial data into a data warehouse and provided access to the data and preformatted reports via the corporate intranet. Integration of SAP R/3 with data warehousing and intranet technology vastly increased the number of people who had access to financial data and vastly increased the risks of non-use, internal abuse, external risk, etc. (Bashein, et al., 1997 ).
An additional consideration is the actions people take to remedy problems that arise as projects and systems pass through their lifecycles. In situations involving system development and operation (as in the progression of a nuclear power plant incident)
people may misdiagnose the causes of problems and apply attempted solutions that actually make the situation worse (Markus and Tanis, 2000) . They thus create new situations that call forth additional actions and changes (Orlikowski, 1996) . Therefore, an integrated theory of IT-related risks must also take into account the second-order consequences of human problem-solving behavior.
Conclusion
Much of the research in the IS field deals directly or indirectly with issues of ITrelated risk, though that term is seldom used. The business world is beginning to see the value of an integrated approach to identifying and managing business risk; the time is right for the IS field to begin developing an integrated approach to identifying and managing IT-related risk. Not only will such an approach be useful to businesses in their attempts to obtain maximum value from their IT investments, it will also help bring 
